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Canine Sniffs and the Admissibility of Evidence
Seized During Lawful Traffic Stops:
Illinois v. Caballes
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FOURTH AMENDMENT - PROTECTION FROM
UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES - The United States Su-
preme Court held that a canine sniff conducted without reason-
able, articulable suspicion of criminal activity during a lawful traf-
fic stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
Illinois v. Caballes, 125 S. Ct. 834 (2005).
On November 12, 1998, Roy Caballes was pulled over for going
six miles over the speed limit, was arrested on a drug-related
charge, and was taken to the police station all within a matter of
minutes.1 During the routine traffic stop, his vehicle became the
subject of a canine sniff conducted by State Trooper Craig Graham
and his drug-detection dog.2  Officer Graham drove to the scene
with the dog after hearing Illinois State Trooper Daniel Gillette
contact the police dispatcher to report the stop.3 When Graham
arrived at the scene, the traffic stop was still in progress. Officer
Graham walked the dog around Caballes' car, and within a minute
the dog responded to the trunk.5  Officers Gillette and Graham
then searched the trunk and found marijuana.6
1. People v. Caballes, 802 N.E.2d 202, 203 (Ill. 2003). Caballes was traveling at a
speed of seventy-one miles per hour on a section of Interstate 80 that had a posted speed
limit of sixty-five miles per hour. Caballes, 802 N.E.2d at 203.
2. Id.
3. Id. Officer Graham responded as a member of the Illinois State Police Drug Inter-
diction Team. Id. Officer Gillette did not call for his assistance. Id.
4. Id. After Officer Gillette radioed the dispatcher, he walked over to Caballes' car
and told him he was speeding. Id. Gillette then asked for his license, registration, and
proof of insurance. Id. Once he collected the requested materials, Gillette directed Ca-
balles to move his vehicle out of traffic and to sit in the police car. Id. While Gillette wrote
out a warning ticket, he communicated with the police dispatcher to verify Caballes' license
information and to check for warrants. Caballes, 802 N.E.2d at 203. Gillette was still in
the police car writing the ticket when Officer Graham arrived. Id.
5. Id.
6. Caballes, 802 N.E.2d at 203.
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Roy Caballes was arrested and charged with one count of can-
nabis trafficking.7 He filed a motion to suppress the evidence
seized during the traffic stop and a motion to quash the resulting
arrest, both of which were denied by the trial judge.8 Caballes was
convicted of the narcotics offense, sentenced to twelve years in
prison, and ordered to pay a substantial fine.9 The trial judge
found that Officers Gillette and Graham did not unnecessarily
extend the traffic stop and that the search of Caballes' trunk was
10
proper.
The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed the decision.11 While
the court did find that Caballes' encounter with the police was in-
appropriately extended, the delay itself was de minimis and did
not warrant the court overturning the lower court's decision.12 The
Illinois Supreme Court, however, reversed, holding that the scope
of the traffic stop was improperly extended into a drug investiga-
tion. 3 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to de-
termine whether reasonable, articulable suspicion is necessary
under the Fourth Amendment to justify the use of a drug-
detection dog to sniff a vehicle during a lawful traffic stop. 4 The
Court ultimately held that canine sniffs performed during legiti-
7. Id. Caballes was charged under 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 550/5.1(a) (West 1998).
Id.
8. Id.
9. Illinois v. Caballes, 125 S. Ct. 834, 836 (2005). Caballes was ordered to pay
$256,136. Caballes, 125 S. Ct. at 836.
10. Id. Caballes' encounter with the police lasted less than ten minutes, and the trial
judge determined that the dog alert provided probable cause to conduct the search. Id.
11. Id. The Appellate Court of Illinois also found that a canine sniff could be conducted
while the stop was in progress without reasonable articulable suspicion. Caballes, 802
N.E.2d at 203-04.
12. Id. at 204.
13. Caballes, 125 S. Ct. at 837. The Illinois Supreme Court was presented with a simi-
lar issue in People v. Cox, 782 N.E.2d 275 (Ill. 2002). In Cox, a police officer pulled over the
defendant's vehicle because it did not have a rear registration light. Cox, 782 N.E.2d at
277. When the officer made the stop, he contacted another officer and asked him to bring
his drug-detection dog to the scene. Id. The second officer arrived approximately fifteen
minutes later while the first officer was writing the traffic ticket. Id. Because the canine
alerted to the presence of drugs, the officers conducted a search of the defendant's vehicle
and of the defendant's person that yielded marijuana. Id. Here, the Illinois Supreme Court
ruled that the canine sniff was impermissible because the first officer lacked "specific and
articulable facts" to request the presence of the second officer and canine unit and that the
detention was unreasonably long. Id. at 281. Similarly, the court in People v. Caballes
determined that the canine sniff was not proper because it was conducted without "'specific
and articulable facts' to suggest drug activity." Caballes, 802 N.E.2d at 204.
14. Caballes, 125 S. Ct. at 837.
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mate traffic stops do not violate the Fourth Amendment." It fur-
ther held that reasonable, articulable suspicion is not required
because no "legitimate" privacy interests are implicated. 6
The Court began its analysis by stating that the initial seizure
of Caballes was lawful because it was based on probable cause of a
motor vehicle code violation. 7 The Court further indicated that
the canine sniff had been conducted while Caballes was being law-
fully detained pursuant to the traffic stop. 8 The Court concluded
that the use of a drug-detection dog would not change the charac-
ter of a reasonably executed and lawful traffic stop unless the ca-
nine sniff infringed upon a constitutionally protected privacy in-
terest.19
For a search to be subject to the Fourth Amendment, the Court
noted that a "legitimate" privacy interest must be compromised."0
In Caballes, the Court failed to find that canine sniffs, which re-
vealed the presence of drugs only, infringed upon a "legitimate"
privacy interest.2 The majority noted that possession of a con-
trolled substance was essentially possession of contraband, which
no person has a right to possess.22 For this reason, the Court held
that conducting a canine sniff for the purpose of finding illegal
contraband during the course of a lawful detention did not violate
the Fourth Amendment.23
Justice Souter wrote a dissenting opinion in which he concluded
that the use of the drug-detection dog during the traffic stop was
not an ordinary incident to the traffic stop and was not justified on
15. Id. at 837-38. Justice Stevens delivered the majority opinion of the Court in which
Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Breyer joined. Id. at 836. Chief Justice
Rehnquist did not take part in the decision of the case. Id.
16. Id. at 838.
17. Id. at 837.
18. Id. The Court accepted the state court's conclusion in making this determination.
Id. The state court found that the duration of the stop was "justified by the traffic offense
and the ordinary inquiries incident to such a stop." Id. In addition, the Supreme Court
stated initially that it proceeded on the assumption that Officer Graham knew only that
Caballes had been pulled over for speeding, and it omitted any facts regarding Caballes
that might have caused suspicion. Id.
19. Caballes, 125 S. Ct. at 837.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 838. Justice Stevens noted that drug-detection dogs are trained to disclose
only the presence or absence of drugs. Id. Although the error rates of the dogs were called
into question, Caballes did not offer evidence to support a finding that canine sniffs could
reveal something other than contraband. Id. Also, Caballes never suggested that "an erro-




any ground.24 According to Justice Souter, a canine sniff should
rise to the level of a search because the possibility of error is sig-
nificant.25  Further, Justice Souter argued that the Fourth
Amendment should be used to determine the reasonableness of
the search and concluded that the canine sniff would be unreason-
able based on the facts in this case.2 6
Justice Ginsburg also authored a dissenting opinion, which Jus-
tice Souter joined.27 According to Justice Ginsburg, the test articu-
lated in Terry v. Ohio" should have been applied to determine
whether the scope of the traffic stop was improperly exceeded.29
While Justice Ginsburg agreed that the initial stop was lawful,
she found that the use of the drug-detecting dog broadened the
scope of the routine traffic stop into a drug investigation." Accord-
ing to Justice Ginsburg, Caballes' Fourth Amendment rights were
violated because the State did not provide evidence that war-
ranted the use of a drug-detection dog.3'
In deciding the principal issue in Caballes, whether canine
sniffs conducted during regular traffic stops were lawful, the Su-
preme Court first addressed whether a constitutionally protected
interest was at stake.32 The idea that a person has a reasonable
expectation of privacy against government searches is rooted in
the Fourth Amendment.33 The Amendment specifies that the peo-
ple shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects.3 4
24. Caballes, 125 S. Ct. at 842-43 (Souter, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 839. According to Justice Souter, earlier cases involving canine sniffs were
decided based on the belief that the dogs were very accurate. Id.
26. Id. at 840. Justice Souter believed that the search was unreasonable because the
troopers did not have any indication of drug activity. Id. Following the same analysis, he
also concluded that any evidence obtained from the illegal search should have been sup-
pressed. Id.
27. Id. at 843-47 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
28. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The Supreme Court held that the reasonableness of a stop could
be determined by examining "whether the officer's action was justified at its inception," and
"whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the inter-
ference in the first place." Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20.
29. Caballes, 125 S. Ct. at 844 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 843.
31. Id. at 844.
32. Id. at 837 (majority opinion).
33. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 2.2 (4th ed. 2004).
34. LAFAVE, supra note 33, at § 2.1. The Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
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For this reason, a Fourth Amendment analysis requires the court
to determine whether a particular government activity constituted
a search based on the area and the interests of the individual.35
The Supreme Court discussed this issue in United States v.
Place.3" In Place, the bags of a suspected drug courier were seized
and taken to another location so that a canine sniff could be per-
formed.37 During the "sniff test," the dog alerted to one of the
bags, indicating the presence of drugs.38 Federal agents obtained a
search warrant based on the positive reaction, and a subsequent
search revealed cocaine.39 The respondent in this case, Raymond
Place, challenged the validity of the detention of his luggage and
moved to suppress the evidence obtained from his bags after he
was indicted on a drug-related charge.4"
In Place, the main issue before the Court was whether law en-
forcement agents could in fact detain and subject luggage to a ca-
nine sniff if they reasonably suspected that the bags contained
drugs.41 The Court answered this question affirmatively by hold-
ing that a law enforcement officer could detain luggage based on
reasonable suspicion in order to investigate the "circumstances
that aroused his suspicion" pursuant to Terry principles.42 The
majority stated that, had the canine sniff been characterized as a
search here, the seizure of the bags would not have been proper
because the federal agents did not have probable cause to search
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
The Supreme Court generally balances the governmental and the private interests
to determine whether a search or seizure was reasonable. WILLIAM E. RINGEL, SEARCHES
& SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS § 4.1 (2d ed. 1979). See, e.g., Illinois v. McArthur,
531 U.S. 326 (2001). The existence of probable cause rule requires that the police not make
an arrest or search unless the information they possessed indicated that it is more probable
than not that a particular person has committed a crime or that particularly described
evidence will be found in the place sought to be searched. RINGEL, supra, at § 4.1.
35. LAFAVE, supra note 33, at § 2.1.
36. 462 U.S. 696 (1983). Before the Supreme Court addressed the issue, a few courts
held that canine sniffs were searches, based on the fact the officer could not discover the
smell using his own senses. LAFAVE, supra note 33, at § 2.2(g). Most courts, however, held
that the use a drug-detection dog was essentially the same as the officer using his own
sense of smell, making the plain smell doctrine applicable. Id.
37. Place, 462 U.S. at 699.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. More specifically, Place was formally accused of possession of a controlled sub-
stance with intent to distribute. Id.
41. Id. at 698.
42. Place, 462 U.S. at 706.
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them.4" The Court did not, however, find that the exposure of the
bags to a drug-detection dog was a search subject to the Fourth
Amendment."
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority in Place, noted that
canine sniffs are different from recognized searches because they
are generally "less intrusive" and are used only for a limited pur-
pose, which is to determine whether drugs are present in a par-
ticular place.45 For these reasons, the Supreme Court classified a
canine sniff as sui generis46 instead of as a search.4 7 Ultimately,
the Court found that the seizure of Place's bags was unreasonable
and held that the evidence obtained from them was inadmissible. s
The determinative factor in this case, however, was the length of
the detention and not the actual exposure of the bags to the drug-
detention dog.49
In 1984, less than a year after Place, the Supreme Court decided
United States v. Jacobsen,5" a case that discussed the issue of
whether a cocaine "field test" was a search within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment.51 In Jacobsen, two Federal Express em-
ployees opened a damaged package, in compliance with company
policy, and discovered what they believed to be drugs.52 The em-
ployees contacted federal drug authorities, who subsequently per-
formed chemical tests that confirmed that the package contained
cocaine."s Based on these results, the federal agents obtained a
search warrant and later arrested the intended recipients of the
package.4 The respondents, charged with possession of a con-
trolled substance with intent to distribute, moved to suppress the
43. Id.
44. Id. at 707.
45. Id.
46. Sui generis can be defined as "of its own kind or class" or "unique." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1475 (8th ed. 2004).
47. Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
48. Id. at 710. The federal agents detained the bags for approximately an hour and a
half. Id. at 699.
49. Id. at 709.
50. 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
51. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 111.
52. Id. The package was described as a box wrapped in brown paper that contained
wrinkled newspapers and a tube. Id.
53. Id. The particular agency that the Federal Express employees contacted was the
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). Id. In this case, different federal agents per-
formed a total of two "field tests." Id. at 112. Both confirmed that the substance in the
package was cocaine. Id.
54. Id. at 112.
178 Vol. 44
Fall 2005 Illinois v. Caballes 179
evidence against them because they believed the warrant resulted
from an illegal search and seizure."
In deciding the principal issue in Jacobsen, whether or not the
"field test" was a search, the Court first determined if the test "in-
fringed an expectation of privacy that society [was] prepared to
consider reasonable."56 After making that determination, the Su-
preme Court found that the "field test" was not a search subject to
the Fourth Amendment.57 Justice Stevens, writing on behalf of
the majority, stated simply that the test did not "compromise any
legitimate interest in privacy" because it showed only whether a
particular substance was cocaine.58 Based on its opinion in this
case, the Court ruled that the evidence against the respondents in
Jacobsen was admissible. 9
In 2001, the Supreme Court decided in Kyllo v. United States °
whether the use of a "thermal-imaging device" to detect heat
within a home was a search subject to the Fourth Amendment.6'
In Kyllo, federal agents scanned the exterior of a house using a
"thermal imager" because they believed that the petitioner, Danny
Kyllo, was growing marijuana inside." The scan of the house re-
vealed concentrated areas of heat, which was indicative of indoor
marijuana growth.' Based on the results of this scan, as well as
informant tips and information obtained from utility bills, the fed-
55. Id.
56. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 122. In California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986), the Su-
preme Court used this two-part test to analyze what constituted a search under the Fourth
Amendment. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 211. The first part of the test asked whether the indi-
vidual had an actual expectation of privacy based on his conduct. Id. The second part of
the test asked whether the individual's expectation of privacy was one that society was
prepared to recognize as reasonable, meaning it was legitimate. Id. This test required
courts to determine whether the government's intrusion infringed upon protected "personal
and societal values." Id. at 212. This test was first articulated in Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring), by Justice Harlan in a concurring opin-
ion. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360.
57. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 124. Before deciding the issue of whether the "field test"
constituted a search, the majority in Jacobsen determined that the removal of the plastic
bags from the tube by the federal agent did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 120.
The Court reasoned that the removal of the bags was not a search because the information
presented to the agent, particularly by the Federal Express employees, left little doubt that
the package contained drugs only. Id. at 119. In addition, the agent obtained this informa-
tion because of a private search, which was not subject to the Fourth Amendment. Id.
58. Id. at 123.
59. Id. at 126.
60. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).




eral agents obtained a search warrant.64 Kyllo was charged with
"manufacturing marijuana" after a subsequent search revealed
marijuana." After he was indicted, Kyllo made a motion to sup-
press the evidence.obtained from the search.66
The Supreme Court in Kyllo, after considering the test set forth
in Katz, held that the use of the "thermal imaging device" consti-
tuted a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, pointed out that where the
inside of a home is the subject of a search, there is a "minimal ex-
pectation of privacy that exists, and that is acknowledged to be
reasonable."8 The majority found generally that the scanning de-
vice was intrusive because it could detect information relating to
the interior of the home. 9 Because the evidence obtained from
Kyllo's home was, in part, the product of an unlawful search, the
Court remanded the issue of admissibility to the lower court."
In Caballes, the Supreme Court based its opinion on two cases,
namely United States v. Place and United States v. Jacobsen, that
presented very different factual scenarios.71 Nevertheless, the
analysis in these cases provided a framework that made the out-
come of Caballes predictable.
In Caballes, the Court framed the issue as whether the Fourth
Amendment required reasonable suspicion of drug possession be-
fore conducting a canine sniff on a lawfully detained vehicle. The
Court stated that reasonable suspicion was only necessary if ca-
nine sniffs compromised constitutionally protected privacy inter-
ests." To start with, the majority discussed the holding in
Jacobsen.74 Jacobsen stood for the proposition that the possession
of "contraband" was not a legitimate interest.75 Possession of con-
traband is exactly how the Court characterized Caballes' interest
because he was attempting to conceal marijuana. Similarly, the
Court found that Caballes had no expectation of privacy.6
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 30.
67. Id. at 34-35.
68. Id. at 34.
69. Id. at 37.
70. Id. at 40-41.
71. Caballes, 125 S. Ct. at 837-38.
72. Id. at 837.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 123.
76. Caballes, 125 S. Ct. at 837-38.
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Jacobsen generally held that a test, which disclosed the pres-
ence of drugs only, was not a search within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment." Similarly, an investigative procedure, such
as a canine sniff, which disclosed the same information, was like-
wise held not to be a search in Place."8 In Caballes, the majority
quickly disposed of the constitutional issue by applying the same
reasoning to conclude that the canine sniff was not a search.79
The Court noted that the Caballes decision was consistent with
its holding in Kyllo v. United States, where it stated that the use
of a "thermal imager" to detect the indoor growth of illegal drugs
was an unlawful search. ° According to the Court, Kyllo was dis-
tinguishable because the investigative procedure used by law en-
forcement agents was capable of detecting lawful activity in addi-
tion to illegal drugs.8' Therefore, the Court stated that Kyllo's le-
gitimate expectation that lawful activity would remain private
was very different from Caballes' expectation that illegal drugs
would remain concealed in the trunk of his car.82 As Justice
Souter pointed out in his dissenting opinion, this distinction is
somewhat troublesome.
The Court's distinction between Kyllo and Caballes makes the
reliability of trained drug-detection dogs problematic. If Justice
Souter was correct in arguing that canine sniffs lack the certainty
and the limited disclosure inherent in other tests, it is possible
that canine sniffs are capable of detecting lawful activity." As the
Court indicated in Caballes, the expectation that lawful activity
will remain private is legitimate and therefore protected by the
Fourth Amendment.85
In Caballes, the Court did not elaborate on what legitimate pri-
vacy expectations a motorist would have, but it did state that any
intrusion on Caballes' privacy expectations did not rise to the level
of a constitutional violation.86 The Court essentially dismissed all
Fourth Amendment implications in this case. Without stating as
much, it seemed the Court determined that the individual's pri-
77. Id. at 838.
78. Place, 462 U.S. at 707.




83. Id. at 840 (Souter, J., dissenting).
84. See Caballes, 125 S. Ct. at 842 (Souter, J., dissenting).




vacy interest was not significant enough to overcome the govern-
mental interests in conducting a canine sniff. If this were the
case, the Court should have used a balancing test in its analysis.
The analysis was undoubtedly warranted given the weight of the
Fourth Amendment protections.
The reasonableness of a canine sniff is generally determined by
balancing the government's interest in using the dog against an
individual's interest in freedom from unreasonable intrusions." In
her dissent, Justice Ginsberg argued that a general interest in
crime control did not justify the intrusion of a canine sniff.88 The
majority, on the other hand, found that the use of the trained nar-
cotics dog was justified given the fact that the dog simply walked
around the exterior of Caballes' vehicle." Caballes illustrates that
contradictory results will inevitably arise because courts charac-
terize and weigh protected interests differently. However, the ap-
plication of a balancing test would ensure, at the very least, that
courts would give some weight to an individual's interests.
In Caballes, the Court held that subjecting a lawfully detained
vehicle to a canine sniff by a trained drug-detection dog, without
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, did not violate the
Fourth Amendment. ° Caballes did not, however, stand for the
proposition that law enforcement officers have unlimited freedom
to use similar investigative procedures in any given circumstance.
Certain constitutional guaranties concerning searches and sei-
zures are still relevant to the use of drug detection dogs in that an
unreasonable or abusive use of a drug detection dog is improper.91
The effect of the Caballes holding will be most likely be limited by
these constitutional considerations.
Finally, states may offer greater protection to an individual
than the Federal Constitution provides.92 Several state courts
have, in fact, declined to follow the holding in Place by finding
that canine sniffs constituted searches under their respective con-
stitutions.93 For this reason, the holding in Caballes will not be
determinative in a number of state courts where attorneys chal-
87. Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, Use of Trained Dog to Detect Narcotics or Drugs as
Unreasonable Search in Violation of State Constitutions, 117 A.L.R. 5th 407 (2003).
88. Caballes, 825 S. Ct. at 846-47 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 836 (majority opinion).
90. Id. at 838.
91. Shields, supra note 87, at § 1.
92. Shields, supra note 87, at § 2.
93. See, e.g., State v. Pellicci, 580 A.2d 710 (N.H. 1990); People v. Dunn, 564 N.E.2d
1054 (N.Y. 1990); Commonwealth v. Johnston, 530 A.2d 74 (Pa. 1987).
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lenge the constitutionality of the canine sniffs based on rights set
forth in the state constitutions.
In Caballes, the Court had to determine whether the police
could subject a lawfully detained vehicle to a drug sniff, absent
reasonable suspicion. The Caballes opinion illustrated that the
Court's characterization of the individual's privacy interest is de-
terminative in deciding whether a canine sniff constitutes a
search, and will also have a bearing on whether evidence seized as
a result of a positive canine alert will be admissible. It is difficult
to predict what impact the Caballes holding will have on future
cases because the Court decided such a narrow issue. It is, how-
ever, clear that the Court will not allow people who possess drugs
to hide behind the Fourth Amendment.
Jennifer M. Palonis

